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Like virtually all developed economies, the United States is projected to
experience a dramatic demographic transition over the next 50 years. By
2040 31 percent of the U.S. population will be 55 and older compared to
21 percent today (see Table 1). Most of this aging will occur among the
older old with the fraction of the population over 65 predicted to almost
double. While the burden on the working population of supporting
dependents will be reduced somewhat due to the lower projected ratio
of children to middle-aged adults, the overall dependency ratio (the
ratio of those under 18 plus those 65 and older to those 18 and 64) will
rise from its value of .616 in the 1980s to .730 in the 2040s.
A higher dependency ratio leads to more consumption relative to
output and a lower saving rate. For the U.S., which has been experienc-
ing a remarkably low rate of saving in the 1980s, the prospect of even
lower saving rates in the future is daunting indeed. Since saving repre-
sents the increase in capital, the saving decline would spell a decline in
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the capital-labor ratio were it not for the fact that the demographic tran-
sition also involves slower growth in the nation's labor supply. On
balance, capital-labor ratios are likely to rise in the developed economies
(see, for example, Auerbach, et al., 1989). Higher capital-labor ratios will
alter factor prices by raising real wages and lowering the real return to
capital. These changes in factor prices will redound to the benefit of
workers in the first half of the next century, but to the detriment of
contemporaneous retirees who will receive lower returns on their sav-
ings. This intergenerational "incidence" of the demographic transition
will mitigate, somewhat, the increased fiscal burden expected to fall on
future workers.
The size of the burden on future workers will depend, of course, on
the fiscal policy response to the demographic transition. With the very
significant 1983 Social Security Amendments (which raised the Social
Security retirement age and made Social Security benefits taxable under
the income tax) the retirement\disability portion of the Social Security
payroll tax appears to be in financial balance in the long run. In contrast,
the Medicare component of Social Security is slated to require additional
funds or benefit cuts around the turn of the century. These projections
reflect the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) intermediate actuar-
ial assumptions. According to the SSA's pessimistic projections, the
combined retirement\disability and Medicare programs will be in sig-
nificant financial trouble by 2020. Even the pessimistic projections as-
sume the accumulation of a substantial Social Security trust fund overDemographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving 75
the next two decades which will help pay for the retirement benefits of
the baby boom generation. If the federal government responds to the
near-term Social Security receipts by reducing payroll or other taxes, as
is now being done implicitly by including Social Security surpluses in
meeting the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets, the result will be
even larger burdens on the children and grandchildren of the baby
boomers.
A related concern about fiscal policy has to do with the growing polit-
ical power of the elderly. While the elderly, defined here as those 55 and
older, currently represent one-fifth of the voting age population, they
will represent almost a third of potential voters by 2020. In exercising
their increased political power, the elderly may seek additional transfers
from the government, which ultimately means from young and future
generations, or, what amounts to the same thing, the elderly may seek
to reduce their tax obligations to the government. A recent example of
this process is the dispute over the Medicare surcharge introduced in
1988 (and repealed in 1989) to pay for the catastrophic health care for the
elderly.
Since the elderly, as a group, appear to consume a greater fraction of
their wealth annually than the young (Abel, Bernheim, and Kotlikoff,
1989) and, certainly, than unborn generations, additional redistribution
toward the elderly will mean additional downward pressure on the U.S.
saving rate.
This paper focuses on U.S. saving, demographics, and fiscal policy. It
addresses the following questions: first, what has been the pattern of
postwar U.S. saving rates—specifically, have saving rates declined in
the 1980s and by how much? Second, is the apparent drop in the saving
rate dependent on how one defines saving? Third, is demographic
change responsible for low U.S. saving in the 1980s? If not, what is?
Fourth, how are the projected demographic changes over the next 50
years likely to affect saving rates during this period? Fifth, since the time
path of saving rates is critical to the time path of current account deficits
in an open economy such as the U.S., how will the demographic transi-
tion influence future current accounts? Sixth, how do fiscal policy and
demographics interact in affecting saving, i.e., how much more detri-
mental to saving are policies that redistribute toward the elderly if they
occur at a time when the population is quite aged?
The next section of this paper describes recent U.S. saving behavior,
pointing out that saving has declined in the 1980s according to a vari-
ety of alternative measures of saving and income. Section II uses data
from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys of the 1980s to consider how
demographics may affect saving rates. The analysis uses the age-76 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
consumption, age-earnings, and age-capital income profiles observed in
these data and asks how saving rates in the past as well as the future
would have looked and would look were these profiles time-invariant.
This experiment asks, then, how saving rates respond to changes in the
age distribution of the population holding all else constant. The analysis
leads to a prediction of higher saving rates in the 1990s, but steadily
declining rates of saving thereafter. The results also suggest, rather
strongly, that demographics cannot explain the low rate of U.S. saving in
the 1990s, nor, indeed, the postwar pattern of U.S. saving.
Section III considers the interaction of future fiscal policies and demo-
graphics with respect to future U.S. saving. We show that changes in
the age distribution of the population are likely to have only minor
effects on government consumption and U.S. saving given the current
pattern of government consumption expenditures by age. In contrast,
intergenerational shifts in the burden of fiscal policy may shift the age-
distribution of private consumption and have important effects on fu-
ture saving rates, with these effects accentuated by the aging of the
population.
Section IV turns to the question of future current account deficits. The
analysis here is partial equilibrium in nature in the sense that the world
interest rate is taken as given. Still, the results seem interesting. Our
calculations lead to the prediction of positive, but declining current ac-
counts (surpluses) over the next 50 years. Section V returns to the ques-
tion of saving in the 1980s, discussing other explanations for its decline.
Section VI summarizes and concludes the paper by pointing out that our
approach toward understanding the effects of demographic change on
saving is only one of many that could and should be considered.
I. RECENT SAVING BEHAVIOR IN THE
UNITED STATES
A meaningful discussion of the level and determinants of the U.S. sav-
ing rate requires care in defining saving. In general terms, saving equals
income less consumption, but one must resolve various ambiguities
concerning the measurement of income and consumption. There are a
number of different measures of aggregate saving, some of which bear
little relationship to an economist's notion of saving. In this section of
the paper, we review and evaluate the alternative measures commonly
used and discuss their performance during the past decade. This will
provide a clearer picture of the recent decline in the U.S. saving rate.
Our analysis indicates that while the rate of saving may depend heavilyDemographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving 77
on one's definition, measurement issues alone do not alter the conclu-
sion that the rate of U.S. saving declined significantly during the 1980s.
Before discussing these findings, it will be useful to review some
national income definitions and accounting identities. Because we are
interested in net additions to national wealth, we begin with the aggre-
gate income measure that excludes depreciation from Gross National
Product (GNP), the Net National Product (NNP). Other income mea-
sures include Disposable National Income (DM), equal to NNP plus
government transfers (R) less taxes paid (T):
DNI = NNP - T + R (1)
and Disposable Personal Income (DPI), equal to disposable national
income less undistributed corporate profits, usually referred to as busi-
ness saving:
DPI = DNI - BS. (2)
Each of these measures of income, NNP, DNI, and DP7, is commonly
used as a base for measuring saving. (Note that, according to govern-
ment accounting procedure, transfers R include interest payments on
the national debt to U.S. households and businesses.)
In addition to different measures of income, alternative saving mea-
sures are based on different notions of consumption. The most basic
measure is household consumer expenditures from the national income
accounts, C. The broader measure would include government expen-
ditures, G. To correct for the fact that some household expenditures
on consumer durables really represent investment, and that, likewise,
some government spending should really be categorized as investment
(there is no official government capital account) one can adjust these
measures by subtracting the investment component of current expendi-
tures, CI, and adding back in the imputed rent on such expenditures,
GIR.
CC = C - CI + CIR (3)
GC = G - GI + GIR. (4)
Making these corrections also alters the corresponding measure of
aggregate income. Aggregate investment spending rises by CI + GI,
exceeding the decline in measured consumption by CIR + GIR. To78 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
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Sources: 1950-1987: Economic Report of the President, 1989; 1988: Survey of Current Business, June
1989
Imputed rent on an asset is calculated as annual depreciation plus 3 percent times the stock of the asset.
Annual depreciation of consumer durables and government non-military tangible assets as well as the
stocks of consumer durables and government tangible assets are reported in the U.S. Dept. of Com-
merce's Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, 1925-1985.
maintain the consistency of the national income identity that net na-
tional product equals consumption plus net investment plus govern-
ment spending plus net exports, one must therefore add the imputed
rent on consumer and government capital to net national product:
1
NNPC = NNP + CIR + GIR. (5)
With these definitions of income and consumption, we now discuss
recent trends in U.S. saving behavior. Table 2 provides annual values of
several different measures of saving over the past decade. The first
1 The corrected net national product measure adjusts the National Income Accounts mea-
sure of net national product by 1) adding the imputed rent on consumer durables and
government tangible assets, excluding military equipment (expenditure on which is
treated as current consumption) and 2) subtracting the depreciation on the stock of con-
sumer durables and government tangible assets (excluding military equipment). Corrected
private consumption measure equals private consumption expenditure on goods and ser-
vices plus the imputed rent on consumer durables. Corrected government consumption
equals the National Income Account measure of government consumption less govern-
ment expenditures on (non-military) equipment and structures, plus the imputed rent on
government equipment (non-military) and structures.Demographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving 79
column presents the personal saving rate, perhaps the most commonly
cited measure of saving. This is the fraction of disposable income that
households save.
HSR = (DPI - Q/DPI = HS/DPI. (6)
It averaged 6.8 percent during the 1950s, 6.7 percent during the 1960s,
and 8.0 percent in the 1970s. Annual values for the period 1980-1982 fall
among these averages. Since then the personal saving rate has fallen
considerably, averaging less than 4 percent during the period 1985-
1988. While the personal saving rate has risen slightly in 1988, it is still
well below the averages of previous decades.
Though popular, the personal saving rate has several shortcomings
that raise questions about its usefulness. First, a significant fraction of
saving has traditionally been done by business, so looking only at per-
sonal saving may provide a misleading picture of the overall saving rate.
Second, empirical research (David and Scadding, 1974 and, more re-
cently, Auerbach and Hassett, 1989) has suggested that personal and
business saving are closely related, that personal saving decisions re-
spond to those of business and cannot be understood in isolation. Third,
the accounting conventions used to define personal income and saving
are necessarily arbitrary. For example, though they are essentially equiv-
alent transactions, the payment of dividends reduces business saving
and increases personal disposable income and saving, while a redemp-
tion of corporate shares does neither. A rise in nominal interest pay-
ments by corporations to households caused by an increase in the
inflation rate also increases measured household income and saving at
the expense of corporate saving, without anything real having hap-
pened. Since the 1980s has been a period during which the inflation rate
and the mix of dividends and share repurchases among corporate distri-
butions has changed significantly, these accounting conventions may
distort one's inferences about recent saving.
Moving to the private saving measure, which includes household and
business saving, eliminates these problems. Such a measure is given in
the second column of Table 2. This private saving rate,
PSR = (DPI + BS - C)I(DPI + BS) = (DM - Q/DNI = PS/DNI
(7)
= (HS + BS)/DNI = (NNP - T + R - C)/(NNP - T + R)
is essentially equal to the fraction of private sector disposal income not
consumed by households. It is higher than the personal saving rate but80 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
shows the same drop in the 1980s. The private saving rate is more
indicative of the rate of household wealth accumulation than the per-
sonal saving rate because households own businesses. If businesses
accumulate assets, these assets belong to households, and should there-
fore be included in our measure of saving. A similar argument may be
made with respect to government saving. Accumulations of assets by
the government increase national wealth, just as private accumulations
do. While the rights to such accumulations may be less easily assigned
to any one group of households, they certainly represent additions to
the wealth of the population (current and future) as a whole, since the
population controls (owns) the government. Like the personal-private
saving distinction, the distinction between government and private sav-
ing is, according to much of economic theory, entirely arbitrary. For
example, a decision by the government to call Social Security contribu-
tions "loans to the government," rather than "taxes," and Social Secu-
rity benefits, "repayment of these loans," rather than "government
transfer payments" would dramatically alter the reported values of pri-
vate and government saving, but should not alter the sum of govern-
ment plus private saving. As before, this point argues for a broader
measure of saving including public as well as private accumulations.
Such a measure, defined by
NSR = (DNI + T - R - C - G)/(DNI + T - R)
(8)
= (NNP - C - G)/NNP
is given in the third column of Table 2. This national saving rate equals
the fraction of net national product not devoted either to consumption
or government spending.
Like the personal and private saving rates, the national saving rate
declined during the 1980s. However, the drop was more precipitous,
with the national saving rate averaging just 3.2 percent during the pe-
riod 1985-1988.
A final measure of national saving incorporates the corrections for
household and government investment discussed above:
NSRC = {NNPC - CC - GQ/NNPC = NSC/NNPC (9)
This measure, given in the fourth column of Table 2, in general shows
much higher levels of national saving than the uncorrected measure in
column 3. This indicates that a considerable amount of national saving
occurs through the usually ignored channels of household and govern-Demographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving 81
ment purchases of capital goods. However, the correction further accen-
tuates the decline in national saving in the 1980s. While the average
uncorrected national saving rate in the 1980s was 3.5 percentage points
lower than in the 1970s, the average corrected measure fell by 4.6 per-
centage points.
In summary, the measures of the U.S. saving rate presented in this
section vary considerably in their estimates of the fraction of income
saved in the 1980s. However, all measures of the saving rate indicate a
very clear decline during the 1980s.
II. DEMOGRAPHICS AND SAVING RATES
Several researchers have remarked about the relative stability of the
shape of U.S. cross section age-consumption and age-earnings profiles
in the postwar period (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981, and Carroll and
Summers, 1989). The stability of these profiles suggests asking what
saving rates would be in the future if these profiles retain their shapes
and current levels; i.e., suppose consumption, earnings, and capital
income at each age as well as the age-pattern of government consump-
tion expenditure stayed the same, how would saving rates evolve over
time as the age distribution of the population changes? The methodol-
ogy underlying this exercise is described in detail in the Appendix. The
population data used in this analysis come from the Social Security
Administration and represent historical figures and projections based on
intermediate assumptions. The relative age-sex consumption, earnings,
and capital income profiles were derived from data based on the 1980
through 1985 Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES) of the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
2 The method used to determine the age-pattern of
2 For the consumption profile, the procedure began with an allocation of total consump-
tion reported by CES households to members within the household. Some of the house-
hold consumption expenditures, such as a child's clothing, could be allocated more
accurately than general expenditures, such as food. Such general expenditures were di-
vided evenly among adults (individuals over 18) and children, but under the assumption
that each child's consumption of general expenditures is one-third of that of an adult. The
resulting data, which consisted of individual consumptions indexed by age and sex, were
next used to form the weighted (based on CES population weights) average value of
average consumption by age and sex for the quarter in question. These values were then
divided by the corresponding quarter's weighted average of consumption of 40-year-old
males. The resulting relative consumptions indexed by age, sex, and quarter were then
regressed against fifth-order polynomials interacted with sex dummies. The predicted
values for this regression provide the values of the R«,m/f's and the R£,//s. The method of
deriving the values of the R£,m/s and the 1^,/,/s is essentially the same except for the fact
that reported earnings are annual and there is no problem of allocating earnings to the
correct individual. The same general method is also used to derive the Ra,m,t's and the
Ra,f,t's profiles. However, rather than using reported capital income which is likely to82 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
TABLE 3
The Effect of Demographics on Saving Rates for Fixed Age-Earnings,












































































* This average is over the period 1980-1988.
government consumption expenditure is described in Auerbach, et al.
(1989).
Table 3 reports the average decade saving rates that are predicted
based on equation (1) for five different base years: 1950,1960,1970,1980,
and 1987. There are several striking features of this table. First, for each
of the base years the saving rate is predicted to rise over the course of the
next three decades and then decline somewhat over the following three
decades. Taking 1987 as the base year, the predicted saving rate in the
1980s is 1.4 percent; it is 5.3 percent in the 1990s, rises to 6.5 percent in
the period 2010-2019, and then declines to 2.6 percent in the 2040s. The
predicted pattern of saving rates reflects the aging of the population
coupled with the fact that the difference between average (over males
and females) earnings and average consumption at a given age is, in the
case of the 1987 base year, negative for ages 20 and below, positive
between ages 20 and 58, and negative after age 58. Figure 1 plots the
difference between average age-earnings and age-consumption profiles
for the base year 1980. The corresponding figure for other base years is
quite similar. Figure 1 can be compared with Figure 2 which plots the
age distribution of the population for a select set of years.
greatly understate true capital income, we used the CES asset data to form annual observa-
tions of weighted average net worth by age and sex. Net worth is the sum of financial
assets, such as stocks, bonds, and checking accounts, and real estate, less mortgages and
other liabilities. A description of the net worth calculation is provided in Abel, Bernheim,
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A second important feature of the table is that the predicted pattern of
saving rates in this decade and the previous three decades do not match
up very well with the observed pattern of saving rates. From demo-
graphics alone one would have predicted high saving rates in the 1950s
and 1980s and low saving rates in the 1960s and 1970s. Clearly, much
more than demographics appears to be at play in the data. Further
research is needed to determine the precise explanation for the failure of
Table 2's predicted time pattern of saving rates to match the actual
postwar pattern.
3 Still, the table suggests that demographic change can,
itself, have very powerful effects on national saving rates.
III. FUTURE SAVING RATES AND THE
INTERACTION OF FISCAL POLICY
AND DEMOGRAPHICS
The saving rate simulations of Table 3 implicitly hold constant fiscal
policy. This section considers how possible changes in government con-
sumption and intergenerational policy affect the predicted saving rates.
We consider first the question of government consumption spending,
holding fixed the age-consumption, age-earnings, and age-capital in-
come profiles. With these household profiles held fixed, Table 4 asks
how the predicted national saving rates would be affected by a change in
our assumption about the response of government spending to demo-
graphic shifts.
The calculations reported in Table 3 assumed a constant age-specific
pattern of government consumption spending. Table 4 presents simula-
tions based on the alternative assumption that government consump-
tion per capita remains fixed through time at the various base year
values. That is, we hold constant government spending per capita rather
than government spending per member of particular age groups. Under
our previous assumption, increases in per capita spending would auto-
matically have been predicted by a shift (from the base year) in the share
of the population accounted for by those groups, such as the elderly,
who individually receive substantial levels of government services.
A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 shows that assuming fixed per capita
government consumption expenditures leads to only slightly lower pre-
dicted saving rates over the next 50 years. At least one reason for this is
that the increases in per capita government spending anticipated in the
3 A better fit does not arise from assuming that the ratio of child to adult consumption of
general consumption expenditures (those that cannot be identified in the CES data as child-
or adult-specific) is one-half rather than one-third.Demographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving 85
TABLE 4
The Effect of Demographics on Saving Rates for Fixed Age-Earnings












































































* This average is over the period 1980-1988.
simulations reported in Table 3 are not that significant. Although the
elderly receive a disproportionate share of government spending, so do
the young (primarily on education). As the population ages, the decline
in spending on the young partially offsets the increase in spending on
the old in the simulations reported in Table 3.
Table 5 considers a related, but more extreme policy change. Suppose
that all funds spent on age-specific government items in the base year
had been directed toward the elderly, and that the level of this spending
per elderly person were kept fixed even as the fraction of elderly in the
population increased over time. This experiment reflects the potential
shift in government spending that would result were the elderly able
to redirect all age-specific spending toward themselves and maintain
such spending levels over time; it surely represents the largest plausible
estimate of the possible impact of population aging on govern-
ment spending.
Since the predicted saving rates in Table 5 incorporate this very strong
assumption, comparing Table 5 with Table 3 indicates the maximum
saving effect likely to arise if the elderly, because of increased political
influence, were able to redirect all of the age-related government con-
sumption expenditure (which excludes defense, etc.) to spending on
themselves. Indeed, such an outcome would have a significant impact
on national saving. As the population ages, a large increase in govern-86 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
TABLE 5
The Effect of Demographics on Saving Rates When All Age-Related












































































* This average is over the period 1980-1988.
ment spending per capita would occur under the assumptions used to
produce Table 5. This leads to a significant fall in predicted saving rates
after the turn of the century. For example, using 1980 as the base year,
we find that the predicted national saving rate for the decade beginning
in 2020 falls from 11.9 percent in Table 3 to 5.5 percent in Table 5.
In addition to changes in government consumption, a second impor-
tant dimension of fiscal policy that can affect saving is the government's
intergenerational policy, by which we mean the extent to which the
government places the burden of paying for its consumption on differ-
ent age groups. If the growing political power of the elderly leads to
reduced taxes on the elderly and more transfers to them, this should
have the effect of rotating the age-consumption profile toward more
consumption by the elderly and less consumption by the young. Table 6
considers the effects of such a rotation on the predicted saving rates.
Specifically, we adjust the benchmark profile of consumption by age
(keeping base year consumption constant) by increasing the relative
consumption of those over 65 relative by 5 percent and reducing the
relative consumption of those under age 45 by 5 percent. Roughly
speaking, one may view this as simulating the effect of cutting taxes on
the elderly by 5 percent of income and raising taxes on the young by 5
percent of income.
As a comparison of Tables 3 and 6 indicates, altering the age-
consumption profile in this manner leads to somewhat higher predictedDemographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving 87
TABLE 6
The Effect of Demographics on Saving Rates When the












































































* This average is over the period 1980-1988.
saving rates from now through 2030 and lower saving rates thereafter.
For example, in Table 3 the 1987 base case predicted saving rates for the
2010s and 2040s are .065 and .026 respectively; the corresponding Table
6 values are .059 and .016.
IV. THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND
FUTURE CURRENT ACCOUNTS
Given the openness of the U.S. economy, the significant saving rate
changes predicted by the simulations presented in Tables 3-6 imply
potentially large international capital flows and movements in the U.S.
current account. The current account is a closely-watched measure in
the area of international trade and competitiveness.
The current account surplus equals the difference between the ac-
cumulation of assets by Americans (including the government) and
investment in the United States by Americans and foreigners. This
difference, referred to as net foreign investment, indicates, if it is posi-
tive, that Americans are, on balance, saving enough to finance not only
all investment in the United States, but also some investment abroad. If,
on the other hand, net foreign investment is negative, saving by Ameri-
cans is insufficient to finance all current investment in the United States
and some current U.S. investment must be financed by foreigners. The
implication of running current account deficits (having negative net88 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
foreign investment) is, therefore, that more of the capital at work in
America will be owned by foreigners. Concern about foreigners buying
up American capital has heightened in the 1980s as the nation ran quite
substantial current account deficits when measured relative to net na-
tional product.
The demographic transition is likely to affect significantly future U.S.
current account deficits both by altering U.S. saving and, therefore, the
accumulation of assets by Americans and by altering the amount of
investment in the United States. In the presence of significant interna-
tional capital mobility, U.S. investment is determined, at the margin,
not by the amount of U.S. saving, but rather by the international capital
market. Given the rate of return that can be earned by investing abroad,
investment will take place domestically up to the point that the return to
capital in the United States equals the internationally determined rate of
return. The domestic rate of return to investment will depend on the
ratio of capital to labor. Hence, it is this capital-labor ratio that will adjust
until the return to investment at home equals the return to investment
elsewhere in the world. Given the supply of U.S. labor, which is deter-
mined in large part by demographics, investment (changes in capital)
will occur up to the point that the U.S. capital-labor ratio is such as to
yield the internationally determined rate of return. Thus demographics,
by affecting the supply of labor, influences the amount of U.S. invest-
ment as well as U.S. saving. Since the current account deficit is the
difference between U.S. investment and U.S. saving, demographics in-
fluences the current account as well.
Section II demonstrated that the demographic transition is likely, over
time, to lower the rate of U.S. saving. Since the growth rate of U.S. labor
supply will also decline, demographics will also lower the rate of U.S.
investment (measured relative to NNP). The question is whether demo-
graphics will reduce saving by more than it reduces investment.
Table 7 presents the predicted values of the current account deficits
for the next six decades divided by predicted net national product. The
first three columns of the table provide estimates based on the assump-
tion of constant world interest rates of 10, 7.5, and 5 percent, respec-
tively. Each of these columns shows large predicted current account
surpluses throughout the period, reversing the experience of current
account deficits in the 1980s. The trend is toward improvement in the
current account surpluses over the next 30 years and a gradual deteriora-
tion thereafter.
Such simulations may overstate the likely current account surpluses,
because they ignore the demographic shifts that will be occurring simul-Demographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving 89
TABLE 7























































taneously in other countries. Many of the mature Western economies
will also experience population aging and associated increases in saving
rates. Together, these increases in saving worldwide can be expected to
depress world interest rates and reduce the outflow of funds from the
United States. To consider this issue, we repeat the current account
calculations just presented, this time assuming that the world interest
rate falls gradually by 3 percentage points between 1990 and 2050 from
the value initially assumed for the simulation. However, even such a
significant drop in world interest rates only slightly diminishes the pre-
dicted surpluses over the period.
V. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
RECENT DECLINE IN U.S. SAVING
While the demographic factors discussed in the previous sections may
help predict the behavior of saving in the future, and may have contrib-
uted to the determination of saving in the past, they clearly cannot
explain the behavior of saving in the 1980s. If our characterizations of
the impact of demographics is correct, then there must have been other,
major determinants of the rate of saving that pushed in the opposite
direction during the 1980s, to offset the rise (relative to the '60s and '70s)
in saving one would have predicted on the basis of demographic factors
alone. This section of the paper briefly considers several alternative
explanations that have been proposed for the decline in saving during
the 1980s.90 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
Government Consumption
One potential explanation for low U.S. saving in the 1980s that can be
dismissed is that increased government consumption is to blame. Table
8 presents the ratio of government consumption to net national product
based on both the corrected and uncorrected data. The corrected data
indicate that the ratio of total government (federal, state, and local)
consumption to NNP was only 0.5 percent higher (22.5 percent versus
22.0 percent) during the first half of the 1980s than it was during the
period 1950 through 1979.
To measure the contribution of this small increase in the share of
government spending out of NNP to the observed decline in the national
saving rate, it is useful to consider the impact on national saving had the
ratio of private consumption, C, to the fraction of output not absorbed by
the government, NNP - G, remained the same. That is, we may define
a saving rate out of private sector resources, which we shall, for conve-
nience, call the non-government saving rate (NGSR),
NGSR = (NNP - G - C)/(NNP - G), (10)
and consider the impact of the increase in G/NNP holding this saving
rate constant. This saving rate differs from the private saving rate de-
fined above if the government's budget deficit, equal to government
spending plus transfers less taxes, G + R - T, is not zero (see equa-
tion 7).
The non-government saving rate seems to be the appropriate measure
of private saving to consider in thinking about changes in government
consumption assuming 1) that government consumption is not a close
substitute for private consumption and 2) that changes in government
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consumption are not associated with changes in the intergenerational
distribution of the burden of paying for government consumption.
Under these assumptions one would not expect a change in the frac-
tion of output absorbed by government spending to affect the rate of
private consumption out of national output left over after government
consumption (NNP — G). If, instead, government consumption were a
close substitute for private consumption, increases in government con-
sumption would likely be offset by decreases in private consumption,
leaving a smaller total impact on national consumption and saving. By
making the first assumption, that the non-government saving rate is
fixed, we are, therefore, biasing our analysis toward a larger impact of
government consumption expenditure on national saving.
Changes in the intergenerational distribution of the burden of paying
for government consumption that accompany changes in government
consumption represent another reason that the nongovernment saving
rate might change with changes in government consumption. We have
discussed above the impact that such intergenerational changes might
have on future saving, and will consider them again below. However,
making the second assumption, and thereby ignoring the effects of such
changes in the intergenerational distribution of the fiscal burden, seems
most appropriate for discerning the effect of increased government con-
sumption, per se, on total national saving.
It is easy to see that the small rise in the ratio of government saving to
NNP could not, in itself, have had a very large impact on the national
saving rate. Using the definitions of the national saving rate (NSR) given
in expression (8) and the non-government saving rate (NGSR) given in
expression (10), we have the relation
NSR = NGSR x [1 - (G/NNP)]. (11)
Expression (11) shows that a one percentage point increase in the ratio of
G to NNP, holding the non-government saving rate constant, would
reduce the national saving rate by only NGSR, or roughly 0.1 percent.
Had the non-government saving rate remained constant in the 1980s at
its average level for the period 1950-1979, the rise in government con-
sumption to NNP in the 1980s would have reduced the uncorrected
national saving rate for the 1980s from .089 (the average rate observed
during the period 1950 through 1979) to .088. Hence, the non-
government saving rate must also have declined substantially during
the 1980s for national saving to have declined as it did. Table 8 presents
corrected and uncorrected measures of the non-government saving rate,
also repeating for convenience the national saving rates given in Table 2.92 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
Regardless of whether one corrects the basic data for consumer durables
and government investment, the non-government saving rate has fallen
dramatically in the 1980s. According to the corrected data, it averaged
16.2 percent over the period 1950 through 1979, but only 9.3 percent
from 1980 through 1985.
Deficits and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy
While the government did not consume much more of NNP in the 1980s
than in the previous three decades, many content that the government,
by running large deficits, shifted the burden of paying for government
consumption from current to future generations. Such a generational
policy, the argument goes, should induce a spending spree by current
generations in response to their reduced tax bill. As an explanation for
the observed decline in saving, however, this view encounters several
problems.
The first problem concerns the measurement of the deficit itself. While
there is no doubt that the official government deficit rose more rapidly in
this decade than in any recent peacetime period, there is reason to doubt
that the government's generational policy was, on balance, as redis-
tributive to current generations as is commonly believed. A closer look
at intergenerational policy shows that a good deal of what the federal
government gave current generations with its right hand during the
1980s, it took away with its left. For example, the 1983 Social Security
amendments reduced the future benefits of current young and middle
age generations by an amount, in present value, roughly equal to their
gain from the income tax cuts. If current young and middle age genera-
tions understand this change and expect it to be sustained in the future,
they should view this loss in future income as requiring them to con-
sume less now and save more for their old age.
Even if one doubts that most individuals make the kind of rational,
present value calculations necessary to "see through" reported budget
deficits to the underlying effects of current and expected future fiscal
policies, there are other reasons to doubt that the deficit is to blame for
our low rate of national saving.
The strongest case for deficits leading to reduced national saving can
be made from a Keynesian perspective. The Keynesian argument goes
like this: households base their consumption decisions on current dis-
posable income; since the household saving rate is very close to zero,
increases in disposable income associated with increases in government
transfers or decreases in taxes will increase consumption nearly dollar
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One problem with the Keynesian approach is that it does not provide
a strong justification for the assumption that consumption is based
primarily on current disposable income. One possible argument for such
an assumption is that American households are liquidity constrained,
which in everyday language means they have few liquid assets and
consume everything they can get their hands on. Hence, if the govern-
ment takes less from them in the form of taxes, they will consume today
every dollar that would otherwise have gone to taxes. However, essen-
tially every study of liquidity constraints has demonstrated that, at
most, 20 percent of American households are liquidity constrained.
Such liquidity-constrained households probably account for, at most, 10
percent of total U.S. consumption.
A second reason to doubt the importance of liquidity constraints is
that the growth of consumption expenditures, at least in the last five
years, has not been limited to non-durables and services, as one would
expect if liquidity-constrained households were the cause of the in-
creased consumption spending. (They would not choose to provide for
future consumption by purchasing durables). The average over the last
five years of the annual share of total expenditures accounted for by
durables is slightly higher than it was in the period 1950 through 1979.
A third reason why the liquidity constraint argument doesn't square
with the facts has to do with the composition of the reported deficit.
Interest payments comprised much of the federal deficits in the 1980s.
For example, in 1985, $130 billion of the $196 billion federal deficit rep-
resented interest payments. Since liquidity-constrained households
obviously aren't bond holders, the key variable to consider for such
households is how the difference between taxes and transfers (excluding
interest payments) changed in the 1980s compared to the earlier period.
And one should consider not simply how federal taxes less transfers
have changed, but how this difference has changed for all governments
combined. For all governments (federal, state, and local), the ratio of
taxes plus transfers to NNP averaged .220 between 1980 and 1987. It
averaged .226 for the 1970s, .239 for the 1960s, and .224 for the 1950s.
Hence, the share of taxes less transfers to NNP was only slightly lower in
this decade than in the previous three decades. In considering these
figures it is also worth noting that the very slight decline in the 1980s in
the ratio of net taxes to NNP primarily reflects a decline in corporate
taxation (which should not affect liquidity-constrained households). In
the 1980s corporate taxes represented only 8.1 percent of total govern-
ment taxes. In comparison, they represented 15.2 percent of total taxes
in the 1960s.94 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
Finally, even if one ignores the problems with the liquidity constraint
argument (that would suggest omitting the interest component of the
deficit) and adopts the Keynesian assumption of a high marginal pro-
pensity to consume additions to disposable income caused by budget
deficits, this still fails to explain the extent of the observed decline in the
national saving rate. To see that this is so, it is useful to note that
the national saving rate (NSR) as defined in (8) is related to the deficit,
D (= G + R - T) and the private saving rate (PSR) defined in expres-
sion (7) by the following identity:
NSR = PSR x [1 - (G/NNP)] - (1 - PSR) x (D/NNP). (12)
Given the near constancy of the ratio of government consumption to
NNP over the past several decades, one can conclude that, holding the
private saving rate fixed, a one percentage point increase in the deficit-
net national product ratio would decrease the national saving rate by
1 - PSR, or about 0.9 percent. Given the increase of 2.7 percent in the
deficit ratio during the 1980s over its average for the period 1950-1979,
had the private saving rate remained constant at its 1950-1979 average
of 10.9 percent, the national saving rate should have declined by about
2.4 percent during the 1980s. In fact, the national saving rate fell by
much more, about 4.5 percent, from the period 1950-1979 to the 1980s.
This greater decline in saving is evident from the sharp declines in the
personal and private saving rates during the 1980s, already shown in
Table 2. Even if deficits relative to NNP had not increased in recent
years, this pattern of private saving rates would have led to substantial
declines in national saving.
To summarize, even under the most extreme Keynesian view of
deficits, one that has a weak theoretical justification, one can attribute
only part of the recent decline in national saving to government budget
deficits. Under more realistic views of the Keynesian model or other,
more plausible, theories of consumption, notably the Life-Cycle model,
one would expect deficits to have much smaller effects on saving, since
households would be predicted to consume only a small fraction of the
increase in current disposable income provided by the tax cuts (Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff, 1987; Poterba and Summers, 1988).
Saving Disincentives
It is hard to argue that saving disincentives are responsible for the de-
cline in saving in this decade since in the first half of this decade the
federal government reduced many saving disincentives. Foremost
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hold capital income, from a top rate of 70 percent in 1980 to 33 percent in
1988.
Some of the policies used to promote savings, such as the IRAs, were,
unfortunately, poorly designed to produce new saving and quite possi-
bly reduced rather than increased saving. Others, such as the move
toward a consumption-oriented tax base associated with the adoption of
the Accelerated Cost Recovery System were not in place for long enough
to have had a significant effect on saving; simulation studies (e.g., Sum-
mers, 1981 and Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987) indicate that many gov-
ernment policies aimed at stimulating savings can have significant
effects that are observed only after decades, rather than a few years.
Increases in the Stock Market
Most theories of consumption predict that households will increase their
spending in response to an increase in wealth. Since the 1980s witnessed
a significant increase in stock market wealth, this may have led to addi-
tional consumption. Because the increases in wealth are themselves ex-
cluded from national income account measures of income, this, in turn,
would overstate the ratio of consumption to true income, and hence
understate the true saving ratio.
However, the increases in consumption that may have occurred in
response to the rising stock market can explain only a small part of the
declining rate of national saving. By far the largest increase in real stock
market wealth during the 1980s occurred in 1985, when household
equity increased in value by $449 billion in excess of the inflation rate.
For the period 1981-1986 as a whole, the cumulative increase in stock
market wealth was roughly double this, about $900 billion. Assuming
that households consume 3 percent of their wealth each year, a rea-
sonable estimate based on past economic research, this would have
accounted for an increase of consumption equal to $27 billion, or .6
percent of NNP, in 1986, with smaller increases in earlier years and
(because of the crash in 1987) later years as well.
However, this estimate for the effect of wealth changes on U.S. saving
is too high for the following reason. The stock market represents less
than 15 percent of total U.S. wealth; for other assets there have, on net,
been offsetting capital losses over the 1980s. If one adds together capital
gains and losses for all U.S. assets net of liabilities over the period 1980
through 1988 the total capital gain is only $260 billion measured in 1988
dollars. This represents only 1.7 percent of total 1988 U.S. net wealth. In
the absence of this cumulative capital gain the 1988 rate of private saving
would have been 6.5 percent rather than 6.3 percent, a very modest
difference indeed.96 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
A Decline in Precautionary and Bequest Saving?
Another potential explanation for the decline in private saving may be
the expansion of insurance which reduces the need for precautionary
savings. The government today provides disability insurance, unem-
ployment insurance, survivor insurance, earnings insurance (through
the progressive tax structure), life span insurance (through its Social
Security annuities), old age health insurance, nursing home insurance
(through Medicaid) and poverty insurance (through its welfare pro-
grams). Economic research suggests that each of these forms of govern-
ment insurance, while of great economic value, can have the undesired
side effect of greatly reducing national savings. Untangling the savings
effects of the provision of each of these forms of insurance is a formida-
ble task, and one that is not likely to yield conclusive answers.
A related explanation for the decline in saving is a reduction in saving
for bequests, which may tie in with the decline in the birth rate. At least
half and possibly as much as two thirds of U.S. wealth can be traced not
to life cycle saving for retirement, but rather to private bequests and
other intergenerational transfers. It is hard to assess whether there has
been a decline in the bequest motive for saving, but such a decline
would not be surprising given the general deterioration of the family in
the U.S. as evidenced by the dramatic postwar rise in the fraction of
marriages ending in divorce and the dramatic postwar decline in the
fraction of the elderly, even the infirm elderly, living with their children.
Much of the saving associated with bequests that occurred prior to
1970 may have reflected the absence of significant annuity insurance. In
1960 old age annuities were only a small component of retirement fi-
nances. Today, social security and private pension annuities are, more
often than not, the major component of retirement finances. Annuitiz-
ing one's resources eliminates the possibility of leaving such resources
to the next generation. In other words, many of the bequests that
occurred in the past may have been unintended, and with annuity in-
struments now widely available, there is less scope for unintentional
bequests. The counterpart of fewer unintentional bequests and the avail-
ability of annuity insurance is that one can consume more since an-
nuities have eliminated the concern about spending one's resources too
quickly; i.e., the availability of annuities may have reduced significantly
precautionary savings in response to life span uncertainty.
Other Factors
There are several other factors that can be dismissed as possible explana-
tions of the decline in U.S. saving in the 1980s. The business cycle is oneDemographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving 97
such factor. While, as one would expect, each of the different saving rate
measures was low during the recessionary period 1981-1983, the rate of
saving did not recover during the subsequent and ongoing boom. For
example, the national (uncorrected), private, and personal saving rates
in 1987 were each lower than they were in 1982.
A second possible explanation is a reduction in income inequality in
the 1980s. According to the Keynesian view, a reduction in income
inequality would shift more income to the liquidity constrained poorer
segment of society and induce greater national consumption. The prob-
lem with this line of argument is that income inequality increased rather
than declined during the 1980s. According to the Congressional Budget
Office (1987), the share of total U.S. disposable income received by the 5
percent of families with the highest disposable incomes was 18.9 percent
in 1977, 20.1 percent in 1980, 23.2 percent in 1984, and 23.5 percent in
1988. The share of disposable income received by the poorest 30 percent
of U.S. families was 8.6 percent in 1977, 8.5 percent in 1980, 7.6 percent
in 1984, and 7.6 percent in 1988.
A third factor is the increase in female labor force participation that
occurred during the 1980s. This factor should, however, have increased
saving, since one would expect part of the increased earnings of females
to be saved. The saving rate should also have increased since, at least in
the life cycle model, the saving rate depends of the fraction of workers,
who save, to retirees, who dissave. An offsetting possibility is that in-
creased female labor force participation reduced the precautionary sav-
ing needed by single-earner couples in the event the single earner
becomes unemployed.
VI. SUMMING UP
This paper suggests that demographic change may significantly alter our
rate of national saving and our current account position over the next 50
years. The gradual aging of the population is predicted to lead to higher
saving rates over the next three decades with declines in the rate of
saving thereafter. Associated with these predicted saving rate changes is
a predicted improvement in the U.S. current account position in the
1990s, with a very gradual deterioration during the subsequent decades.
While demographics is a potentially very important factor in ex-
plaining saving, it does not appear to explain the drop in the U.S. saving
rate in the 1980s. Indeed, based on demographics alone, one would
have predicted saving rates to be high and roughly equal in the 1950s
and 1980s and considerably lower in the 1960s and 1970s. What hap-
pened to U.S. saving in the 1980s remains an intriguing puzzle.98 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
APPENDIX
AL Simulating the Effects of Demographics
on Saving Rates
The method used to simulate the effects of demographic change on
saving rates can be understood more precisely by looking at the follow-
ing formula for the national saving rate in year t, St.
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The first term in the numerator of the ratio in (Al) is per capita private
consumption in base year b. This is expressed as consumption per 40-
year-old male in year b, c40/W> multiplied by a summation. The terms
R
caitn and R
ca>f in the summation are, respectively, the ratios of average
male and average female consumption at age a relative to the average
consumption of a 40-year-old male. And the terms Qa,m,t and 8fl/^ are,
respectively, the male and female shares of the population age a in year
t. The two terms in the denominator of the ratio in (Al) are defined
symmetrically, except that the first deals with capital income and the
second deals with labor earnings. The terms gy>b, gm>b, g0/b and gb are, respectively, the ratio of government consumption expenditure per
young person (age 0 to 18), per middle age person (age 19 to 64), per old
person (65 plus), and per capita. Finally, the terms fJy/f, (3m/t, and p0/t are, respectively, the fraction of the year t population that are young, middle
age, and old.
Given base year values of gy> gm> g0/b, gbr c40,m> em>m>b, and fc40,W/b and the values of the relative age-sex consumption, earnings, and capi-
tal income profiles (the K£,m/s, R
ca,f,t's, Ra,w/s, R%,flt's, Ri,m,t's, and
Ra,f,t's) one can use equation (1) to determine how saving rates would
change with changes in the age-sex composition of the population (the
0a,m/s, 8fl/^'s, Py/s, Bm/s, and Bo/s). The procedure for determining base year values of c40,m> e4o,m> and k4Ormrb is provided in equations (A2) through (A4).
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VKb = k40,m,b X [Rf,mP«,«,6 + «f,A/,"] (
A4)
Equation (A2) indicates that total consumption in year b, Cb, can be
expressed as the product of c40,m,& times the sum of the products of the
age-sex consumption ratios and the levels of population in year b in a
given age-sex category (the Pa,m,b's)- Equations (A3) and (A4) are the
analogous expressions relating e40/W/b to total labor earnings, Eb and
^•AQm,b to total base year capital income, YKb. Given values of Cb, Eb, and
YKb as well as the terms within the summations of equations (A2), (A3),
and (A4), these three equations can be solved for c40,m> e4o,m> and
M0,m,b«
The procedure for finding gVib, gm/b, gOrb, and gb is similar. Specifically, we used Auerbach et al.'s (1989) age-decomposition of government con-
sumption expenditure to determine the values of gVibl gm/b/ g0/b and gb, which stand, respectively, for government consumption per person age
0-24, government consumption per person age 25-64, government con-
sumption per person age 65 +, and per capita non-age-specific govern-
ment consumption, gb. Government consumption per capita in year t
is then determined by multiplying these four values by their corre-
sponding populations in year t and dividing by the total population in
year t. Unfortunately, data are available only to calculate values of gV/b,
gm,b> go,bf
 and gb for the period of the mid-1980s. Hence, in the calcula-
tions presented below, these values are used regardless of the base year
indicated.
For each base year the value of total private consumption (used in (A2)
to solve for c^Q/rriib) corresponds to the National Accounts figure (unad-
justed for durables) for that year. In addition, base year net national
product (again unadjusted) is divided between labor and capital income
using the national accounts data on employee compensation and propri-
etorship income and assuming that the share of proprietorship income
that represents payments for labor is the same as the ratio of aggregate
labor income to net national product.
A2. Simulating the Effects of Demographics on the
Current Account
To simulate the effects of demographics on the current account, we
begin by assuming a value, r, of the world interest rate. Dividing 1987100 Auerbach & Kotlikoff
capital income from the national income accounts by r gives us an esti-
mate of 1987 U.S. assets, A1987. To find A1988, A1989, through A205o we use the following formula:
At+1 = At + stNNPt (A5)
In (A5) At is assets at year t (e.g., 1987), st is the year t saving rate as
calculated in Section II above with 1987 as the base year, and NNPt is net
national product in year t, which is also calculated as in Section II above
with 1987 as the base year; i.e., it is the sum of 1) average capital income
of a 40-year-old male in 1987 times the summations of the cross products
terms (the Rm,cfim,a,t's and the R^fy/fl/s) plus 2) average labor income of a







The level of the capital stock at time t is determined by assuming a




where D is a coefficient whose value is determined in equation (A7), a is
capital's share of net national product, and Lt is the supply of labor in
year t. The value for a was determined from the National Accounts data.
The value of Lt is given by the second summation in the denominator of
equation (10). Since the marginal product of U.S. capital must equal the
world interest rate r, we have:
(AT)
Given a value for r and K1987, we insert the 1987 value of Lt and use (A7)
to solve for D. The value of K1987 is determined from the 1987 current
account reported in the national accounts. Specifically, r(K1987 - Ai987) is
set equal to the 1987 current account deficit less the 1987 trade account
(exports minus imports). This equation is then used to solve for K1987.
Having determined the value of D in (A7), we use (A7) to predict values
of K1988 through K2050 by inserting the predicted values of Lt for the
appropriate year in question. Since the current account deficit in year t,
CAt, is defined as:
CAt = [Kt + 1 - At + 1] - [Kt - At] (A8)Demographics, Fiscal Policy, and U.S. Saving 101
we simply insert the predicted time paths of capital stocks and assets to
determine the time path of CAt.
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